The Relationship Between Cognition and Culture
To consider the relationship between human cognition and culture, one must be able to consider the ways in which cognition extends beyond the physical body and into its environment. Through the lens of active externalism, human cognition can be viewed as a coupled relationship between an organism and an external entity (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). To what extent does the scope of this external entity cover this definition, within the context of distributed cognition? This paper attempts to explore both sides of the argument as those who agree with this question often point to the apparent symbiotic relationship between cognition and culture (Hutchins 2011), while those who are against this proposition instead clarify that although they may seem related, they exist as individual and separate entities
Pro 1: Cognition’s influence on culture.
Human cognition is not separable from culture because of their dynamic interaction which forms a tightly coupled system due to its two-way interactive nature (Hutchins, 2011). Both components establish a cognitive system that affects the agent to a certain degree since they both play an active causal role in the individual (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). From the causal perspective of cognition to culture, we see that it requires cognitive processes to craft the sociocultural standards that define a society’s culture. This is where the concept of the extended mind becomes relevant. In order to apply the principles of the extended mind, the definition of culture must be understood. Culture at its core essence is the set of customs and beliefs that manifest from an intellectual human collective (Hutchins, 2011). In Clark and Chalmer’s The Extended Mind (1998), there is the reference that “beliefs can be constituted partly by features of the environment, when those features play the right sort of role in driving cognitive processes. If so, the mind extends into the world” (p. 12). The origins of culture first lie within the individual’s own cognitive processes. The external environment feeds information into the individual’s mind filtering out irrelevant information and keeping what is necessary. When the kept information fits into the mental framework that minds have, individuals undergo a cognitive process to formulate a belief or custom that can then be shared into their environment contributing to defining that culture. Therefore, culture is crafted through a shared collective mind that is apparent in every society. Along the lines of linguistics, language serves as a tool to complement our internal cognitive processes (Hutchins, 2011) and this is relevant because it is another example of which we extend our cognition onto the environment, which can then be construed into the culture.
Pro 2: Culture’s influence on cognition.
In an attempt to explore the previous statement further, language can on the other hand act as a barrier restricting cognitive processes due to vocabulary differences amongst varying cultures. In this case, culture acts as the environment for an agent which significantly influences the establishment of an individual’s cognition (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). According to Hutchins, human cognition is bound to the culture that binds it (2011) and when comparing the culture of the United States to the culture of China, there is a substantial difference between the two (Pogosyan 2017). With this example, it is safe to hypothesize that the people from those two regions would consequently undergo cognitive processes very differently. Doctor Pogosyan, in her article “How Cultures Wire Our Brains” (2017), dives further into these cultural differences influencing cognition as “numerous fMRI studies have shown how cultural background can influence neural activity during various cognitive functions.” This distinction is relevant because it demonstrates that culture physically alters the brain’s structures through a process called neural plasticity. Depending on what culture an individual is exposed to, some neural networks may be more synaptically active than others: “For instance, cross-cultural differences in brain activity among Western and East Asian participants have been revealed during tasks including visual perception, attention, arithmetic processing, and self-reflection” (Pogosyan, 2017). This explains why people from different cultures approach tasks or solve problems differently when compared to each other. Pogosayan’s findings, therefore, complement Hutchins’ claim that “cultural practices… are fully embodied skills” (Hutchins, 2011, pg. 441) such that cultures make significant contributions laying the foundation from which cognition can arise. Even more, people undergo a phenomenon called priming due to the culture and the language they are exposed to during adolescence (Pogosyan, 2017). This furthers the argument that culture and cognition are intrinsically related as priming allows for the manifestation of certain behaviors influenced by exposure to culture.
Con 1: Cognition is intrinsic to the “naked mind,” and culture merely augments it.
The opposing case — that human cognition is separable from culture — effectively decouples the symbiotic relationship mentioned in the previous section by separating the naked mind from its environmental supports (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Clark and Chalmers depict the naked mind as “a package of resources and operations … [that] brings to bear on a cognitive task,” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, pg. 10) such that cognition stems from and subsequently occurs because of operations intrinsic to the naked mind. This depiction is significant because it allows Clark and Chalmers to suggest that “true cognitive processes” are substantiated independently by the naked mind and “anything else is an add-on extra” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, pg. 10). With the insight that there exists a “general tendency of human reasoners to lean heavily on environmental supports,” the scope of the term “anything else” is narrowed as Clark and Chalmers’ view of the naked mind suggests that external agents like language and culture augment — yet are distinctly separate from — cognition (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, pg. 8). Likewise, it is important to note that this proposition contrasts Hutchins’ theory of distributed cognition, which instead “does not expect all such events to be encompassed by the skin or skull of an individual,” because it reinforces the notion that cognition occurs within the mind while external elements such as culture enhance processes which already exist (Hutchins, 2001, pg. 1). This distinction is relevant as it relates to culture because it supplements the idea that “as the individual brain performs some operations, … others are delegated to manipulations of external media,” such that Clark and Chalmers’ conceptualization of “environmental supports” augments the mind yet still functionally “delegate” as units separate from the naked mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, pg. 8). Thus an argument of the opposing case follows that cognition occurs in the “naked mind” and humans use environmental supports, such as culture, to augment thinking.
Con 2: Cognition and culture are internal/external entities under mental extension.
The notion that human cognition is separable from culture can be further clarified through an exploration of the defining elements of culture as an environmental support and its relation to mental extension. For Kirsh, mental extension qualifies that “external … processes must play second fiddle to the inner processes that organize and control the system’s behavior” (Kirsh, 2018, p. 5). As a continuation of the argument from the previous paragraph, these “inner processes” can be defined as the processes of the naked mind — leaving culture as an environmental support, in this case, assigned to the role of “second fiddle.” It is with this distinction that a clear separation between the first “internal” mind and the second “external” culture becomes clear. Kirsh continues to explore the nature of mental extension with the proposition that “mental extension happens … when a person creates thought through action” and this clarification is relevant as it implies that mental extension between culture and cognition could depend on how one chooses to define culture (Kirsh, 2018, p. 11). This condition falls in line with Hutchins’ claim that culture is commonly defined and “reduced to mental representations [or] a collection of lifeless artifacts” (Hutchins, 2011, p. 444) as neither of these definitions portray culture as an environmental support that satisfies Kirsh’s proposition. Even so, a closer examination of mental extension as it relates to both culture and cognition is useful in clarifying that human cognition is separable from culture, depending on how culture is defined.
Synthesis/Opinion
Those who agree with the idea that cognition and culture are inseparable argue that these two entities dynamically interact within the contexts and constraints of active externalism and distributed cognition. Those in opposition that although these two entities interact with each other, they ultimately exist independently. We refute the opposing perspective and believe that human cognition is not separable from culture as there is sufficient evidence that these two components are necessary when constructing a cognitive system, such that “when it comes to human cognition, most of the causal powers of the human brain derive from previous experience in cultural practices” (Hutchins, 2011, pg 445). Semantically, we interpret that cognition is the process of thinking, the method of composing thought and thus our thoughts are based on our experiences and the beliefs that were produced from those experiences. The events we experience are deeply rooted in the society we live in and the culture that society places over us (Hutchins 2011). Thus, society and culture influence our own cognitive processes to an extent that our cognition is part of a collective mind relative to that society or culture.
In conclusion, human cognition is not separable from culture since both of these components are so deeply integrated into one another. Cognition is like play-doh, and culture is like a mold. The mind is very malleable due to neural plasticity and can structure itself to adapt to external stimuli. Society has a cultural framework that is constructed from a shared collective mind which can assimilate new minds to be a part of that collective. Culture, like the mold, forms the shape of the play-doh.
References
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19. doi: 10.1093/analys/58.1.7
Hutchins, E. (2001). Cognition, Distributed. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2068–2072. doi: 10.1016/b0–08–043076–7/01636–3
Hutchins, E. (2011). Enculturating the Supersized Mind. Philosophical Studies, 152(3), 437–446. doi: 10.1007/s11098–010–9599–8
Kirsh, D. (2018). When Is a Mind Extended? Andy Clark and His Critics, 128–142. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780190662813.003.0011
Pogosayan, M. (2017, January 26). How Culture Wires Our Brains. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/between-cultures/201701/how-culture-wires-our-brains?amp